APA
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de la Cuesta, B., Milner, H., Nielson, D., & Knack, S. F. (2019). Oil and aid revenue produce equal demands for accountability as taxes in Ghana and Uganda. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
Chicago/Turabian
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Cuesta, Brandon de la, H. Milner, D. Nielson, and Stephen F. Knack. “Oil and Aid Revenue Produce Equal Demands for Accountability as Taxes in Ghana and Uganda.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2019).
MLA
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de la Cuesta, Brandon, et al. “Oil and Aid Revenue Produce Equal Demands for Accountability as Taxes in Ghana and Uganda.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2019.
BibTeX Click to copy
@article{brandon2019a,
title = {Oil and aid revenue produce equal demands for accountability as taxes in Ghana and Uganda},
year = {2019},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
author = {de la Cuesta, Brandon and Milner, H. and Nielson, D. and Knack, Stephen F.}
}
Significance People ought to care more about how the government spends their taxes compared with oil or foreign aid revenues. Yet, in developing countries, obfuscation by value-added taxes and citizens’ feelings of ownership over all public revenues may equalize distinctions. Four experiments in Ghana and Uganda conducted on citizens and members of parliament indicate no significant differences between taxes, aid, and oil in perceptions that the revenues will provide public goods or leak to corruption. All revenue types equally motivate citizens to demand accountability, prompting reevaluation of the claim that taxes promote greater political action. Citizens do see meaningful differences for aid delivered through nongovernmental organizations, suggesting that the channel of funds matters for accountability. Received wisdom argues that citizens more readily demand accountability from government for taxes than for nontax revenue from oil or foreign aid, giving rise to an important mechanism underlying the “resource curse,” which posits that nontax revenue causes citizen quiescence and hampers government accountability. However, in developing countries, obfuscation through value-added taxes and strong popular feelings of ownership over all revenues may minimize differences across revenue sources. Identical experiments on representative samples of Ghanaians and Ugandans, and similar experiments on members of parliament, probe the effects of different sources and delivery channels of government revenues on citizens’ actions to monitor governments and members of parliament (MPs’) beliefs about accountability pressures. Roughly half of all citizens take action to monitor all 3 sources. However, neither Ghanaians nor Ugandans demand more accountability for taxes than oil or aid when the revenues go to the government. MPs likewise saw no difference. Citizens do differentiate between aid money given to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) compared with revenues delivered to the government. Findings are robust to numerous alternatives and subgroups. Against strong expectations from prior research, little evidence exists showing that taxes strengthen citizens’ demands for accountability or that MPs perceive differences across revenue sources in these 2 representative African countries. However, aid channeled through NGOs motivates more accountability pressures.